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Introduction
Global sourcing has been defined as the acquisition of components and products from international sources, including both sources internal to the company and external suppliers (Kotabe and Omura, 1989) . Over the past two decades, global sourcing has played an increasingly important role in both the fragmentation of production across countries by multinational corporations (MNCs), and crossborder trade more generally. Official statistics show that the annual percentage change in world exports and imports grew at 14.1% and 13.9%, respectively in 2010 (UNCTAD, 2012a), with intra firm crossborder trade of product and components historically accounting for one-third of all trade flows (UNCTAD 2012a and 2012b; Zeile, 1997) . Further, data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) show the imports from unaffiliated parties to US multinational corporations grew from $45 billion in 1989 to $154 billion in 2004 while imports from foreign affiliates to their US parent increased from $62 billion to $170 billion.
The growing importance of global sourcing is reflected in increasing academic interest in this phenomenon. In particular, recent years have seen the emergence of a substantial body of work at the intersection of organizational economics and international trade that examines the drivers of global sourcing (Antras and Rossi-Hansberg, 2009 ). Based in economics, this literature has developed detailed theoretical models of the choice between offshore integration and offshore outsourcing, focusing on the trade-off between the lower fixed costs of outsourcing and the reduced profits resulting from the noncontractibility of third party effort (Grossman and Helpman, 2002; Antras and Helpman, 2004; Antras, 2005) . Subsequent empirical work has partially validated these theoretical models, using cross-sectional trade data at the industry level to show that the extent and nature (integrated or outsourced) of global sourcing depends upon such factors as dispersion of productivity (Yeaple, 2006) , contract enforcement (Nunn, 2007) , headquarter intensity (Nunn and Trefler, 2007; Bernard et al., 2010) and financial constraints (Carluccio and Fally, 2012) .
While this work offers valuable insights on global sourcing, its focus has been on the role of global sourcing in allowing firms to access low-cost inputs in foreign countries, with models assuming that it is primarily low-skill tasks that will be moved offshore (Antras and Helpman, 2004; Grossman and Rossi-Hanberg, 2008) 1 . Yet, as a substantial body of work in strategy has argued and shown, firms look to foreign countries not only for low-cost inputs, but also for knowledge and expertise (Chung and Alcacer, 2002; Alcacer, 2006; Berry, 2006; Alcacer and Chung, 2007) . These knowledge-seeking motives 1 Investments in comparable or higher cost countries are associated with market-seeking horizontal FDI aimed at avoiding tariffs in this literature, and are therefore unrelated to global sourcing (Yeaple, 2003a) have been shown to play an important role in driving FDI (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005; Nachum, Zaheer and Gross, 2008) as well as in determining multinational location choice (Shaver and Flyer, 2000; Chung and Alcacer, 2002; Alcacer and Chung, 2007) . In addition, strategy scholars have shown that foreign subsidiaries play an increasingly important role in developing global capabilities (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Frost, Birkinshaw and Ensign, 2002; Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005) and enhancing firm knowledge (Penner-Hahn and Shaver, 2005; Singh, 2005; Zhao, 2006; Berry, 2013) , with recent work suggesting that firms are increasingly offshoring administrative and technical services in order to tap into growing pools of technical and scientific talent abroad (Manning, Massini and Lewin, 2008; Lewin, Massini and Peeters, 2009; Gregorio, Musteen and Thomas, 2009 ). There is thus strong evidence that access to foreign knowledge and expertise is a key aspect of a firm's multinational strategy decisions, yet the impact of foreign knowledge seeking on global sourcing remains to be explored.
This paper tries to bridge this gap by examining the effect of foreign knowledge seeking on firm global sourcing decisions. Specifically, we combine the theoretical logic for the choice of organizational form from the organizational economics tradition, with the recognition in the strategy literature that firms are increasingly looking to foreign knowledge and expertise, to develop a more complete theory of global sourcing. We argue that as the availability of relevant knowledge and expertise in foreign countries increases, firms will increasingly look to undertake R&D in these countries. This increase in foreign R&D will be accompanied by an increasing reliance on global sourcing of products and components, because of the benefits that are associated with collocating R&D and production (Adams and Jaffe, 1996; Bergen and McLaughlin, 1992; Hatch and Mowery, 1998; Alcacer and Delgado, 2012) , especially where such collocation also enables the firm to tap into lower input costs for production. In order to capture these collocation benefits, however, firms will prefer to source products from owned foreign operations to overcome problems of non-contractibility of effort and knowledge transfer associated with sourcing from external suppliers. Thus an increasing emphasis on foreign knowledge seeking will be accompanied by a shift towards greater offshore integration and away from offshore outsourcing.
We develop these arguments into a formal model that compares the relative profitability of alternate organizational arrangements in a context where firms endogenously determine the extent of R&D undertaken abroad, as a function of the availability of foreign knowledge and the benefits of collocating R&D and production. We test the predictions of this model on a unique and comprehensive database of cross-border product transfers by US MNCs from 1989 to 2004, combining confidential firmlevel data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis with patent data from the US Patent and Trade Office (USPTO). Consistent with our theory, we find that as firms increasingly invest in foreign R&D in the context of increasing industry-relevant foreign knowledge, they both increase their offshore integration and reduce their offshore outsourcing.
Overall, this study contributes to both the economics and strategy literatures by showing how the global sourcing decisions of firms are impacted by the growing importance of foreign knowledge seeking.
Theoretically, we offer a rigorous theoretical account of firm global product sourcing decisions, one that incorporates both low-cost and knowledge seeking motives for global sourcing, as well as the organizational economics considerations driving the choice of integration or outsourcing. In doing so, we contribute to the strategy literature by examining the effect of knowledge-seeking investments on global sourcing, and developing a formal account of the choice of organizational form for this product sourcing.
At the same time, we contribute to the economics literature by incorporating into existing theory the insight that firms may look not only for low-cost inputs from foreign countries but also foreign knowledge and expertise. Empirically, our unique data allow us to study the drivers of global sourcing using a longitudinal firm-level analysis for the population of US manufacturing MNCs, providing a more rigorous test of theories of global sourcing than those undertaken in extant literature.
Knowledge seeking, collocation benefits, and global sourcing
As discussed above, our focus in this study is on examining the effects of foreign knowledge seeking on the extent and organization of global sourcing. Traditional theories of global sourcing have focused on the benefits of foreign production in giving firms access to low-cost inputs (Caves, 1996; Yeaple, 2003b) , allowing them to leverage abundant labor pools (Dunning, 1998; Nachum et al., 2008) and lower production costs both domestically and across the world (Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter, 2001; Kleinert, 2003) . In line with this, formal models of global sourcing in economics have focused on the reduction of component costs as the key reason for going abroad, with firms restricting skill-intensive tasks to the home-country headquarters and sourcing low-skill components from around the world (Antras and Helpman, 2004; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008) .
In contrast to these low-cost seeking arguments, a growing body of work in strategy has emphasized the role of foreign knowledge and expertise in driving firms to locate in foreign countries.
Knowledge seeking motives have been identified as a key driver of FDI (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005; Nachum et al., 2008) with firms choosing to locate in areas with strong relevant knowledge (Chung and Alcacer, 2002; Alcacer and Chung, 2007; Chung and Yeaple, 2008 ) so as to benefit from knowledge spillovers (Almeida and Kogut, 1999) and develop and extend their existing knowledge by recombining it with foreign knowledge (Cantwell, 1989; Penner-Hahn and Shaver, 2005; Singh, 2005; Berry, 2013) . As the supply of relevant knowledge and expertise in foreign countries increases, therefore, firms will increasingly undertake R&D abroad (Alcacer, 2006) , combining the gains from local knowledge spillovers with internal linkages within the firm (Almeida and Phene, 2004; Alcacer and Zhao, 2012) to create new knowledge and capabilities that enable them to compete globally (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Frost et al., 2002; Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005) .
A critical, and well understood, aspect of such knowledge-seeking activities is the need to undertake foreign R&D internally, rather than depend upon external suppliers of knowledge (Zhao, 2006; Alcacer and Zhao, 2012) . R&D activities aimed at developing rent-generating capabilities, will result in the creation of knowledge that is specialized or co-specialized to the firm, and must therefore be internalized to avoid hold-up problems ex-post (Williamson, 1975; Argyres and Zenger, 2012; Kaul, 2013) . Outsourcing strategically critical R&D to third parties would compromise the appropriability of knowledge thus created (Teece, 1982; 1986) , so that firms may prefer to keep R&D in-house in order to protect their knowledge from imitation and expropriation by others (Liebeskind, 1996) . These problems may be especially severe in weak appropriability regimes (Silverman, 1999) , such as in foreign countries
where weak intellectual property protection may make it necessary for firms to internalize their knowledge resources (Zhao, 2006) . In addition, outsourcing R&D would limit the extent to which new knowledge generated could be integrated and recombined with the firm's existing knowledge, given the difficulties of transferring knowledge across firm boundaries, so that firms may choose to internalize R&D even absent problems of opportunism and appropriation (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996) .
For all of these reasons, knowledge seeking R&D in foreign countries is likely to be conducted internally, especially where the intent of such R&D is to develop knowledge and capabilities that enable the firm to compete globally (Alcacer and Zhao, 2012) .
Of course not all foreign R&D will reflect knowledge-seeking activities by firms (Kuemmerle, 1999) . Investments in foreign R&D in the absence of relevant global knowledge may represent merely an attempt by firms to modify their products to suit local markets, since in the absence of strong pools of foreign knowledge and expertise, the firm's ability to recombine such knowledge to develop global capabilities will be limited (Jaffe et al., 1993; Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Singh, 2005; Alcacer and Chung, 2007) . Thus, we would expect firm foreign knowledge seeking investments in foreign countries with higher levels of industry expertise to best capture foreign knowledge seeking by firms.
While the idea that the availability of relevant knowledge and expertise in foreign countries will drive firms to internally develop and transfer knowledge from subsidiaries in these countries is wellestablished, we know relatively little about how such knowledge seeking impacts the global sourcing decisions of firms for components and products. Recent work on the offshoring of administrative and technical services suggests that the growing availability of talent pools abroad will drive firms to shift these services offshore (Manning et al., 2008; Lewin et al., 2009) , but this work tells us little about global sourcing, nor does it distinguish between offshore outsourcing and offshore integration. Beyond some early work that shows a positive performance effect of integration of innovation-intensive components when sourcing offshore (Kotabe and Murray, 1990; Murray, Kotabe and Wildt, 1995) and an increasing role for both subsidiary R&D and offshore sourcing (Kotabe and Swan, 1994) , we thus know little about the effect of knowledge seeking on global sourcing.
In this paper, we argue that increasing foreign R&D will be accompanied by an increase in foreign production, as firm seek to realize the benefits from collocating the two activities. Several studies have shown that greater proximity between R&D and production is associated with superior productivity (Adams and Jaffe, 1996) , superior performance (Bergen and McLaughlin, 1992) , superior innovation (Hatch and Mowery, 1998 ) and greater quality conformance (Gray, Siemsen and Vasudeva, 2013) .
Collocation of R&D and production improves manufacturing performance by enabling greater coordination of product and process innovation (Kotabe and Murray, 1990; Ettlie, 1995; Datar et al., 1997) , and easing the transfer of sticky knowledge between R&D and production units (von Hippel, 1994; Hansen and Lovas, 2004) . Greater communication and collaboration between units also aids in the knowledge transformation cycle (Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003) , enabling firms to better deal with the reciprocal interdependencies between R&D and production (Thompson, 1967; Van de Ven, 1976) , and allowing for greater learning-by-doing on the shop floor (Argote, 1999) .
In order to fully capture these collocation benefits, however, firms may need to integrate R&D and production; i.e. to carry them out within a common organizational boundary. First, the coordination and communication efforts required to realize the collocation benefits described above are likely to be non-contractible, so that the realization of these benefits will be compromised unless R&D and production are integrated under common ownership (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Plambeck and Taylor, 2005) . Second, integrating R&D and production within the same organization will better enable the transfer and coordination of knowledge between the two units and enable the recombination of knowledge necessary to realize collocation benefits (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Grant 1996; Berry, 2013) , lowering the pragmatic boundaries that stand in the way of knowledge transformation (Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003; Carlile, 2004) . Third, integrating R&D and production will protect the firm from the risk of knowledge appropriation by third parties (Teece, 1986; Liebeskind, 1996; Zhao, 2006) , and may therefore make it easier for knowledge developed by the R&D unit to be shared with the production unit. Other things being equal then, firms looking to capture benefits from collocating R&D and production in foreign countries will prefer to integrate offshore production rather than outsource it.
To summarize, our central argument is that as the availability of relevant knowledge and expertise in foreign countries increases, firms will increasingly seek to tap into this foreign knowledge by undertaking R&D in foreign locations. These investments in offshore knowledge seeking will be accompanied by an increase in offshore production as firms seek to realize the benefits of collocating R&D and production; benefits that will best be realized when R&D and production are carried out within the same organization. Thus, an increase in knowledge-seeking activities abroad will cause global sourcing to shift towards offshore integration and away from offshore outsourcing.
A formal model of global sourcing
To lay out the argument above more fully, we develop a formal model of firm global sourcing decisions in the presence of foreign knowledge seeking, based on a modified version of the model developed by Antras and Helpman (2004) . In particular, while the Antras and Helpman model focuses on the effects of firm productivity and headquarter intensity on global sourcing decisions, our focus is on the extent of R&D conducted offshore and its impact on global sourcing.
The model
We consider the sourcing decision of a firm operating in a world with two countries, North and South. The firm sells finished goods in the North, and faces a downward sloping demand curve such that total revenue R is given by where Q is the total volume of finished goods produced and A is a constant reflecting the demand schedule. 0 < α < 1 is a measure of product differentiation, where the elasticity of substitution σ is given by .
The firm has a fixed technology that involves combining 1 unit of R&D with 1 unit of production 2 to produce θ units of output. The parameter θ is thus a measure of the firm's productivity. For ease of exposition, we assume that firms are making R&D and production decisions for final finished goods, though the analysis would be identical if we were considering R&D and production decisions for a single component, with the R&D and production of all other components being held constant.
Following Antras and Helpman (2004) , the firm can undertake production either in the North (N) or in the South (S) and it can either produce in-house (v) or outsource to a third party (o). Each unit of the production costs to produce, where . The cost of production is dependent solely on location,
i.e. it is the same whether the production is done internally or outsourced. As in Antras and Helpman (2004) we assume these costs are fixed and exogenously determined. In addition, as with their model we assume for simplicity that transportation is costless and there are no tariffs (or equivalently, that transportation and tariff costs are included in ).
We further assume that basic production is standardized and not firm-specific; i.e., the firm can outsource production to a third party supplier without encountering difficulties of hold up or noncontractibility (indeed, this is the reason that is both constant and the same under integration and outsourcing). Note that this assumption only applies to basic production. As we discuss in detail below, bargaining problems resurface as soon as production is connected to R&D, i.e. as soon as production is modified in firm-specific ways. We make this assumption for simplicity; assuming that outsourcing basic production gives rise to contracting problems, as Antras and Helpman (2004) do, only makes outsourcing less attractive on average, without fundamentally altering the predictions from our analysis.
In addition to the variable cost , production is associated with a fixed cost . We follow Antras and Helpman (2004) in assuming that fixed costs are higher in the South than they are in the North, and they are equal or higher for outsourcing than for integration. Thus, Since we are interested in the firm's global sourcing decisions and not its choice of integration or outsourcing domestically, we further assume, for simplicity, that . Coupled with the variable cost of production being the same under either organizational form, this assumption means that there is no advantage to domestic outsourcing relative to domestic integration, so in what follows we will generally ignore the domestic outsourcing option. Note that this assumption in no way impacts the choice between offshore integration and offshore outsourcing.
Firms can perform R&D either in the North or in the South, but is always undertaken internally, in line with our discussion above about the challenges of hold up, appropriation and knowledge transfer associated with outsourcing R&D 3 . Unlike production, R&D can also be split between countries, with some proportion being undertaken in the South and the rest in the North. Every unit of R&D costs the firm . We assume that the firm faces an upward sloping supply curve, so that , where is a measure of the supply of research expertise in the country and is the proportion of total R&D undertaken in the country L under organizational form k, where . As with production, the cost of R&D is the same whether it is integrated or outsourced.
We assume that the North is relatively knowledge abundant compared to the South so that . This implies that , i.e. the cost of doing research in the South is higher than the cost of doing research in the North. The primary logic behind this assumption is that the North is relatively abundant in supply of knowledge and expertise, though the higher costs of doing research in the South may also reflect the additional cost of maintaining secrecy in a regime with weak intellectual property protection (Zhao, 2006) , or, equivalently, the risk of knowledge appropriation. Note also that is the cost of doing one unit of equivalent research in each country, not the wage rate of knowledge workers in that country. 4 For simplicity, we assume that so that .
In line with the theory above, we model the benefit of collocating R&D and production as a potential productivity improvement of . The improvement in productivity is proportional to the share of R&D undertaken abroad, i.e. if the firm locates of its R&D in the country where it undertakes production, then the improvement in productivity is
The benefits of co-location are the same in the North and the South, but they depend upon whether production is outsourced or integrated. As discussed above, the firm is unable to capture the full benefit of collocation if production is outsourced. We model this reduction in productivity as a factor , which equals the share of the collocation benefit the firm is able to capture under each organizational form. For simplicity, we assume that there is no loss of collocation benefits when production is done internally 5 , i.e. , and that the productivity loss from outsourcing is the same in both the North and the South, so that .
Foreign R&D choice
Given these conditions we can derive the profit maximizing equilibrium for the firm under each organizational form, and then compare the equilibrium profit to see which organizational form is the 4 Assuming higher research costs in the North does not materially impact the trade-off between offshore integration and offshore outsourcing in the model. It only means that activities in the North are dominated -with both production and research costs lower in the South, the firm has little reason to operate in the North. 5 This is different from Antras and Helpman (2004) who assume there is some bargaining loss even when production is integrated. Assuming that , as Antras and Helpman (2004) do, does not significantly alter our main predictions optimal for the firm to choose (Antras and Helpman, 2004) . Note that in order to maximize profit, the firm has two decisions to make -it must choose how to divide R&D activities between the North and South, and it must choose its level of input (and therefore its level of final output).
We begin by considering the first choice, i.e. the firm's choice of . The firm will choose this fraction of R&D undertaken in the country of production so as to minimize its variable cost per unit output. Since all R&D not undertaken in the country of production is undertaken in the North at cost , the firm's variable cost equals
A key feature to note about the expression in (1) is that, unlike in Antras and Helpman (2004) , the firm's productivity (the term in the denominator) and therefore its variable cost is endogenously determined by the firm's choice of foreign R&D investment and organizational form. This is a consequence both of allowing the firm to have the option of conducting some or all of its skill intensive R&D activities in the South, and of our assumption about the benefits of collocation.
Given (1), we can derive the value that minimizes variable cost. From (1), the first order condition is:
Note that, since by assumption , we further assume . Thus, if the firm locates production in the North, it also undertakes all R&D in the North. This follows from the fact that and , implying that moving any R&D to the South when production is in the North will only increase costs by lowering productivity and potentially increasing research costs.
Two points about the result in (2) are worth noting. First, note that is increasing in , since
This implies that the greater the availability of research expertise in the country, the greater the proportion of R&D undertaken there, other things being equal. In particular, as the availability of research expertise in the South increases, firms may increasingly prefer to move their R&D abroad. We can define the upper bound:
Second, the partial derivative in (3) is strictly increasing in , meaning that the greater the fraction of the co-location benefit the firm is able to capture, the greater the increase in the fraction of R&D co-located with production as a result of increasing supply of research expertise 6 . In other words, for any given level of , where the equality only applies where .
Notice also, from (4), that . Together, these results imply that as the supply of research expertise in the South increases, the proportion of R&D undertaken in the South will be higher and will rise at a faster rate under integration than under outsourcing. The intuition behind this is that the firm has less to gain from collocation under outsourcing than under integration, and therefore has a weaker incentive to move R&D abroad if production is outsourced.
Profit maximizing equilibrium
Having determined the optimal level of foreign R&D the firm will undertake, we can then examine its choice of input level. Recall that given a fixed technology, and with the extent of collocation of R&D and production determined as above, the firm's productivity is fixed, so that choosing a level of input (x) is equivalent to choosing a level of output (Q). We therefore solve for the profit maximizing level of x. From the assumptions above, the firm's overall revenue is given by
and its total profits are given by:
… (6) where is the cost per unit input.
Taking the first order conditions for (6), setting and substituting from (5), we can derive an expression for the firm's equilibrium profit under each organizational form:
… (7) 6 The partial derivate of (3) w.r.t. is
Since, by assumption, , , and
Foreign R&D and choice of organizational form
Given (7) As is clear from (8) above, the equilibrium profit under domestic production is unaffected by changes in the availability of foreign knowledge, so that the domestic production line in Figure 1a is horizontal. This line represents the baseline level of profit the firm would realize if it chose not to source globally at all; for global sourcing to be chosen the profits from either offshore integration or offshore outsourcing must exceed this profit level. Note also that the Z term in (7) is the same across all organizational forms since it depends only on the characteristics of the market the firm faces and the firm's baseline productivity ( , so that in comparing the alternate organizational forms we need consider only differences in and .
Consider first the firm's global sourcing choice in the absence of foreign knowledge seeking. This is represented by the intercepts of the lines in Figure 1a , which show the equilibrium profits where and therefore . From (7), where , , which in turn means that since by assumption . In other words, given the higher administrative costs of offshore integration, coupled with the standardized nature of basic production, firms will prefer offshore outsourcing to offshore integration in the absence of foreign R&D. In terms of Figure 1a , this means that the intercept of the offshore integration line will always be at or below the intercept of the offshore outsourcing line.
Consider next what happens as foreign knowledge seeking increases. To begin with, foreign knowledge seeking will tend to make global sourcing more attractive overall. As the availability of research expertise abroad increases, and firms invest in foreign R&D, the advantage of home production (which is a result of collocation benefits) declines, making global sourcing increasingly attractive. In the extreme, if the extent of foreign knowledge made it optimal to shift all R&D abroad ( , then the variable cost of integrated production in the South would be lower than that of integrated production in the North
7
, raising the probability of global sourcing. Of course, firms may still prefer to produce domestically if the difference in fixed costs were enough to overcome the difference in variable costs (as would be the case for firms with very low Z, i.e. low productivity firms in relatively small markets), but in general, global sourcing is more likely to be preferred as foreign knowledge seeking increases. In figure 1a , this is reflected by the upward slope of both the offshore integration and the offshore outsourcing lines.
In addition to making global sourcing more attractive overall, foreign knowledge seeking will also alter the relative profitability of offshore integration and offshore outsourcing. As figure 1a shows, as the availability of relevant foreign knowledge ( ) rises, the equilibrium profits under offshore integration rise faster than the equilibrium profits under offshore outsourcing. This happens for two reasons. First, as discussed above, and shown in figure 1b, increases in cause the extent of foreign R&D to rise faster under offshore integration than under offshore outsourcing, i.e. responds more sharply to increases in than , because, as shown in (3), the slope of the line in figure 1b is increasing in and . The intuition is that since the firm is unable to capture the full value of collocation benefits under offshore outsourcing, its incentive to shift R&D abroad is lower, so that faced with the same supply curve (determined by ), the firm will tend to undertake less R&D abroad under outsourcing. Thus, as shown in figure 1b, the extent of foreign R&D increases faster and reaches the maximum sooner under offshore integration than under offshore outsourcing, only becoming equal when 7 Assuming that the differences in wages between North and South dominates the research costs, i.e., . , i.e. when foreign R&D costs are low enough to make it optimal to conduct all R&D abroad irrespective of the organizational form.
A second reason the benefits of foreign knowledge seeking are dampened by offshore outsourcing is the direct effect of the lost collocation benefits on the profits from global sourcing. Even with the same level of foreign R&D spending, the productivity of foreign operations is higher under offshore integration than under offshore outsourcing, because the firm is able to realize the full benefits of collocating R&D and production. As a result, variable costs will be lower and profits higher under offshore integration than offshore outsourcing in the presence of foreign knowledge seeking, other things being equal. This is easily seen from the fact that the variable cost in (1) is decreasing in . Thus, the variable costs of production under offshore integration are lower than under offshore outsourcing, even for the same level of foreign R&D spending.
The bargaining and knowledge transfer problems represented by thus have two effects on the benefits of knowledge seeking in the model. A direct effect of reducing the extent of collocation benefits captured by the firm, and an indirect effect of reducing the extent to which R&D is collocated with production, thus reducing the extent of collocation benefits realized overall. Together, these two effects imply a reciprocal relationship between foreign R&D and foreign production: not only will firms investing in foreign R&D want to internalize foreign production, but firms with prior investments in internalized foreign production may be more prone to investing in foreign R&D.
Putting these two effects together means that, as the availability of relevant foreign knowledge increases, and firms increase their foreign R&D spending, the gap between the variable cost of production under offshore outsourcing and offshore integration ( ) will rise, reaching a maxima where , i.e. where all R&D comes to be shifted abroad under offshore integration. As a result, equilibrium profits under offshore integration will rise faster than those under offshore outsourcing with increasing foreign knowledge seeking, making it increasingly likely that offshore integration will be preferred to offshore outsourcing as knowledge-seeking activities abroad increase.
Note that the improvement in relative variable cost does not guarantee that offshore integration will necessarily be chosen over offshore outsourcing -if the lower fixed costs of outsourcing dominate the greater productivity enabled by the full realization of collocation benefits under integration, then firms may still prefer to source from third-party suppliers, even as they invest in internal foreign R&D. This may happen, for instance, where political or regulatory difficulties make the costs of establishing or running a foreign subsidiary prohibitive, or where the contracting problems associated with third party sourcing are low, such as when dealing with technologically superior or trustworthy suppliers, so that the firm can capture most of the collocation benefit even with third-party production. So long as the differences in fixed cost are modest, and the loss of collocation benefits from outsourcing substantial, however, the superior collocation benefits of offshore integration will come to dominate the lower fixed costs of offshore outsourcing. Thus, as figure 1a shows, the firm will reach a point where , beyond which it will prefer offshore integration to offshore outsourcing.
Overall, as shown in figure 1a and discussed above, our predictions from our formal model support our verbal intuition in the previous section:
Hypothesis: Increasing foreign knowledge seeking by firms will be accompanied by an increase in the extent of offshore integration and a reduction in the extent of offshore outsourcing.
Additional predictions
The discussion thus far focuses on the choice between offshore integration and offshore outsourcing in the context of increasing foreign R&D. While this choice is the focus of our study, the model offers several other predictions about the relative benefits of offshore integration and offshore outsourcing, as well as about the benefits of global sourcing more generally. In particular, whether the firm chooses to source globally at will depend upon the equilibrium profit under offshoring relative to the profit under domestic sourcing. To examine these factors, consider again the case where there is no foreign knowledge seeking (i.e. the intercept in Figure 1a ). In this case, the firm will source globally only if profits under offshore outsourcing are greater than the baseline profits under domestic sourcing, i.e. if
. From (7), in the absence of foreign R&D this will be true if
The inequality in (9) suggests several factors that will impact the choice between global sourcing (either through offshore integration or offshore outsourcing) and domestic sourcing where there is no effect of foreign knowledge seeking. First, consistent with global sourcing being driven by low-cost seeking motives, global sourcing is more likely to be preferred, the higher the cost of production in the North relative to the South (i.e. the higher ⁄ ). Second, given that, by assumption, , the probability of global sourcing is increasing in Z, meaning that, consistent with the predictions in the prior literature (Antras and Helpman, 2004) , the firm is more likely to source globally through offshore integration or offshore outsourcing, the higher its productivity ( , and the higher the demand in its home market (A), other things being equal. Relatedly, the fixed cost assumption means that the likelihood of global sourcing increases as the difference in fixed costs between domestic and global sourcing declines.
This may happen as the firm increases its production capacity abroad, with economies of scale implying that fixed costs would increase at a diminishing rate with increases in capacity. Or it may result from improvements in information technology that lower the costs of administering foreign operations and make offshoring more attractive (Rangan and Sengul, 2009). Finally, (9) suggests that the probability of global sourcing is lower, the higher the potential benefit from collocating R&D and production ( ; the intuition being that the greater the cost to firm innovativeness from offshoring production to low-cost countries, the more it makes sense for firms not to source globally (Fuchs and Kirchain, 2010) .
While these predictions are not the focus of our study, they are important both because they provide insight into the drivers of global sourcing more generally, and because they show that the predictions of our model match those of prior studies on global sourcing when knowledge seeking is not considered, thus increasing confidence in the model. 
Data and Methods

Data
Our primary source of data is the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We use firm-level data collected in the BEA's benchmark surveys of US direct investment abroad from 1989 to 2004 to construct our measures of offshore integration and offshore outsourcing as well as our explanatory variables, supplementing them with other data sources where necessary. Because the BEA surveys are mandatory, these data provide the most comprehensive information on the worldwide operations of US MNCs available. 8 The BEA surveys are also unique in providing in-depth data on intra-firm, cross-border product transfers between affiliates other firm operations, as well as third party imports to parent firm operations, making them ideal for our purpose. We include only the benchmark years (1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004) in our study because these surveys reflect as close to the population of US MNCs as possible.
We restricted our sample to manufacturing industries (SIC codes 200-399) because product-flow measures are less meaningful for service industries. While the BEA collects data on all foreign affiliates (defined as business enterprises in which the firm has 10% or greater ownership), we restrict our sample to majority owned affiliates (more than 50% ownership), which we term subsidiaries. We do this because majority-owned affiliates are required to report more detailed information than minority-owned affiliates (50% or less ownership). 9 The vast majority of the subsidiaries in our sample are fully owned (with a 95% average ownership percent). Comparisons between our variables created using only subsidiaries with variables created using all affiliates show no statistical difference in sample means. This is not surprising since minority owned affiliates make up less than 10% of all foreign affiliates of US MNCs. After merging all data sources, we end up with an unbalanced panel of 437 MNCs that we analyze in our empirical results below.
Measures
Dependent Variables: Our dependent variables capture both intra-firm product transfers (offshore integration) and imports from unaffiliated third parties (offshore outsourcing). We base our measure of offshore integration on the intra-firm product transfer measure developed by Kobrin (1991) , which he defined as the ratio of intra-firm cross-border transfers to the total foreign sales of the firm, including both parent exports and subsidiary sales. Consistent with Kobrin (1991) as well as with prior work on global sourcing (Kotabe and Swan, 1994) we include both cross border transfers of goods from subsidiaries to parents and cross border product transfers of goods from subsidiaries to other subsidiaries, as reflecting the full extent of a firm's global sourcing. Our numerator includes only intra-firm sales from owned operations in foreign countries while the denominator includes both intra-firm sales and sales to third parties (with third party sales including both parent and subsidiary sales to third parties). This measure thus reflects the proportion of cross-border sales that are intra-firm.
To measure offshore outsourcing, we use the ratio of imports from third party unaffiliated parties to the parent firm operations by the worldwide sales of these firms. While a better measure would capture the offshore outsourcing for both parent firm operations and their foreign affiliates, in line with our offshore integration measure above, we are limited by the data that is collected by the BEA on their surveys, which only capture offshore outsourcing that goes to the parent firm in the US.
Independent Variables: Turning to independent variables, we measure the availability of foreign knowledge using patent data from the NBER patent data project. 10 Patent data have been widely used to study foreign innovation and knowledge seeking (Almeida and Phene, 2004; Singh, 2005 . Specifically, we first calculate the ratio of the stock of non-U.S. patents to the stock of total patents in every patent class. Patent stocks are calculated using a 15% depreciation rate (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005) , and the country of patent origin is based on the country of the patent's first inventor.
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The ratio of non-US patents for an SIC is calculated as the weighted average of the ratio of non-US patents in all patent classes, with the weights being the frequency with which a patent in a particular patent class maps to that SIC, based on a convergence between patent classes and SICs developed by Silverman (1996) 13 . Thus industry global knowledge i = ∑ p j * w ij / ∑ w ij , where p j is the proportion of non-US patents in patent class j and w ij is the proportion of patents in class j that belong to industry i.
We capture firm foreign R&D intensity as foreign subsidiary R&D expenditures divided by foreign subsidiary sales. Though foreign subsidiary R&D expenditures are unavailable in most public datasets, the BEA surveys ask firms to report expenditures on the pursuit of new scientific knowledge in their foreign subsidiaries (see Yorgason, 2007 for more discussion of the BEA survey questions). Foreign subsidiary R&D thus provides a strong measure of the extent of foreign knowledge development. While our main results measure subsidiary R&D weighted by foreign subsidiary sales, we also use a measure of foreign R&D as a proportion of overall R&D spend, as discussed in the robustness section below
Since the main prediction from our model relates to the effect of foreign knowledge-seeking activities, i.e., of foreign R&D in the context of relevant foreign knowledge, we include the interaction between the firm foreign R&D intensity and industry global knowledge as the key test of our study's prediction. As discussed above, greater foreign R&D spending in the absence of global knowledge may simply reflect adaptation to local conditions. Foreign knowledge seeking requires both availability of foreign knowledge and attempts to capture it via foreign R&D, so that it is best represented by the interaction between the two terms, which is thus our main variable of interest.
Controls: We include several industry-and firm-level controls in our models. First, at the industry level, we incorporate measures of the production costs the firm faces both at home and abroad.
Domestic cost pressures are measured as the average production wages per hour in the US in the firm's 11 Chung and Yeaple (2008) construct their measure at the industry-country level, rather than the industry level. Their measure also differs from ours in that they use a different concordance between patent class and industries than the Silverman concordance we use (see footnote 13). As they acknowledge, the two concordances are correlated at around 0.95. They also use a 20% depreciation rate for knowledge stock. 12 An alternate measure, using country of assignee rather than country of first inventor is found to have a correlation of 0.92 with the current measure, and yields similar results. Note that the NBER provides measures based on inventor locations only up to 2002. 13 The Silverman concordance maps patent classes (IPC) to industries (SIC) by calculating the proportion of patents in each IPC that belong to a particular SIC using data from the Canadian patent office. This concordance has been widely used in the strategy literature (Silverman, 1999; Alcacer and Chung, 2007) . More details at: http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/~silverman/ipcsic/documentation_IPC-SIC_concordance.htm main industry, using data from the NBER-CES manufacturing database (Bartlesman, Becker and Gray, 2000) . This represents a direct measure of domestic production cost ( ).
Since we do not have comparable measures of production wages by industry for foreign countries, we proxy for foreign production costs by measuring the extent to which production is located in developing countries. Developing countries are generally lower cost locations, so that a greater proportion of production capacity in developing countries would imply lower foreign production costs on average (Caves, 1996; Dunning, 1998) . Specifically, we include a measure of each firm's investments in lowcost countries using the firm's proportion of plant property and equipment (PPE) located in developing countries (more specifically the ratio of developing country PPE to total foreign PPE). We classified countries into developed and developing using the World Bank country classification, including all countries in the high category as developed countries and the remaining countries as developing, since our home country is a highly developed one. Note that this measure is constructed at the firm level, since different firms in the same industry may locate production in different countries. The Developing Country PPE measure thus reflects the relative production costs of the countries in which the firm operates.
In addition to controlling for industry cost conditions, we include a measure for industry growth, calculated as the average one year growth in sales for all firms in the industry (including both domestic and multinational firms), since our model suggests that global sourcing increases with increasing industry demand (A). , Further, we expect the availability of technologically sophisticated potential suppliers in the firm's main industry to increase offshore outsourcing (Argyres, 1996; Jacobides and Hitt, 2005) . To account for this, we control for the technological sophistication of potential foreign suppliers in the firm's main industry by constructing a measure of the extent of industry-relevant innovation undertaken by foreign firms in the US. We use patent data to measure industry-relevant patents with US inventors assigned to foreign firms as a proportion of total industry-relevant patents in the year.
At the firm level, we control for the productivity and size of our parent firms by including measures of parent sales (logged) and profitability as measured by return on assets (ROA). As predicted by our model, and consistent with prior work (Antras and Helpman, 2004; Yeaple, 2006) , we expect larger, more productive firms to be more likely to undertake global product sourcing (through either offshore integration or offshore outsourcing). We also include a control for the firm's global presence, operationalized as the proportion of foreign assets to total assets, to account for the fact that firms with greater foreign presence may have lower relative foreign fixed costs, and may therefore be more likely to source globally 14 . All three of these firm-level measures are created using data from the BEA surveys.
In addition to these factors, we include a number of additional firm-level controls. First, since R&D intensity has been shown to impact global product integration in prior work (Kobrin, 1991; Rangan and Sengul, 2009 ), we include a measure for parent firm knowledge intensity using R&D expenditures divided by parent sales (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Caves, 1996; Berry and Sakakibara, 2006) . Second, we include a dummy that takes a value of one when the firm does no R&D in foreign countries, to account for the fact that many of our firms may have no foreign R&D, since R&D tends to be the last activity that firms internationalize (UNCTAD, 2004; Berry, 2013) . Third, to account for alternative motives for global sourcing we include measures of relative real exchange rate (RER) and tax rate, based on the firm's foreign locations. Specifically, we use IMF reported end of year RERs to calculate a weighted exchange rate growth over benchmark years (defined as RER t -RER t-5 /RER t-5 ) for each firm, using weights based on the percent of total foreign assets the firm has in each focal country. Similarly, we also calculate firm-weighted tax difference based on the time-varying host country reported corporate tax rates from the World Tax Database at the University of Michigan. We calculated the tax rate difference from the US for each country in which our focal firm has operations and used weights based on the percent of total firm foreign assets in the host country. Table 2 summarizes the various measures used, as well as the data sources used to construct them, and Table 3 provides summary statistics and correlations. ***Insert Table 2 and Table 3 about here***
Method
For our main results, we use fixed-effects panel regressions (using the xtreg, fe command in STATA) with lagged dependent variables and firm and period fixed effects. The general form of the equation is:
Global Sourcing it+1 = β 1 *Global Knowledge it + β 2 *Firm Foreign R&D it Intensity + β 3 *Firm Foreign R&D it Intensity*Global Knowledge it + β x *Controls it + α + γ i + θ t + ε it
Where β x is the set of coefficients for the industry and firm level controls described above, γ i is a fixed effect for industry I, θ t is a fixed effect for period t, and α is a constant. We ran separate models for our offshore integration and offshore outsourcing dependent variables below. Our main prediction is that β 3 will be positive for offshore integration, and negative for offshore outsourcing.
The use of models with firm fixed-effects allows us to control for time-invariant characteristics that may impact the feasibility of cross-border product transfers, including technical parameters such as value by weight or value by volume. Our fixed-effects models also account for any unobserved heterogeneity across firms. The use of a fixed-effects model is also indicated by a Hausman test of our main specification, which rejects the hypothesis that the random-effects model is not significantly different from the fixed-effects model. Though serial correlation is not as much of a concern in panels with fewer years, to examine whether autocorrelation is an issue in our models, we ran the xtserial command (in STATA) on our variables. From this test, we fail to reject the null that there is no significant autocorrelation across our variables for our offshore integration models (F = .109, p>.30) or for our offshore outsourcing models (F = .16, p>.68). Further, to confirm the robustness of our results, we also ran our models with alternate measures and used system dynamic panel estimators, both of which we describe in more detail in the section on robustness below.
The use of a lagged structure across our models provides for a stricter test of the causal relationship implied by our hypothesis. Since the benchmark data we use are available only once every five years, a one period lag implies that we are predicting the level of global product integration as a function of the level of our independent variables five years before. This long lag allows us to ameliorate concerns about reverse causality, which may otherwise be an issue in a model where both dependent and independent variables are endogenously determined.
Results
The results of our empirical analyses are presented in Tables Four and Five. Table Four shows our fixed effects panel regression results, with Models I and II reporting the results for offshore integration and Models III and IV reporting the results for offshore outsourcing. Table Five examines the robustness of our results by reporting alternate measures for foreign knowledge seeking and an alternate specification using system dynamic panel estimation.
Our main prediction from our model is that as the availability of relevant foreign knowledge increases, and firms increasingly undertake R&D abroad, there will be an increase in the extent of offshore integration and a reduction in the use of offshore outsourcing. We examine this prediction using the interaction between firm foreign R&D intensity and the extent of industry relevant knowledge in foreign countries. Looking at the main effects for these variables first, we find a positive and significant main effect for global knowledge on offshore integration -this is consistent with our model, which predicts that the attractiveness of offshore integration will increase with growing availability of foreign knowledge, even at the same level of foreign R&D. Considering the marginal affects in terms of standard deviation increases, the results in Model I imply that one standard deviation increase in industry global knowledge results in a 22% standard deviation increase in offshore integration. Turning to firm foreign R&D intensity, Models 1 and II show that though this coefficient is positive, it is not significant. This is not surprising given that firms can do R&D in foreign countries both to create new knowledge and adapt existing firm knowledge to the local market. When foreign R&D is primarily adaptive in nature, it is not likely to result in increasing transfers from subsidiaries, since the knowledge developed through adaptive foreign R&D will only be locally relevant (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000) . Interestingly, the no foreign R&D dummy has a significant and positive coefficient in the offshore outsourcing model, suggesting that, consistent with our theoretical model, offshore outsourcing is preferred in the absence of foreign knowledge seeking.
Our main test of our model comes from the interaction between firm foreign R&D intensity and industry global knowledge. This interaction term reveals strong support for our prediction. Model II in Table Four shows a positive and significant coefficient for the (mean-centered) interaction between firm foreign R&D intensity and industry global knowledge with offshore integration while Model IV in Table   Four shows a negative and significant coefficient for this same interaction term with offshore outsourcing.
This suggests that offshore integration increases with increased firm investments in subsidiary R&D in industries where knowledge is global while at the same time offshore outsourcing decreases as firms invest in subsidiary R&D in industries where knowledge is global. More specifically, the results in Models II and IV suggest that in firms with higher foreign R&D intensities (defined as one standard deviation above the mean firm foreign R&D intensity), a one standard deviation increase in industry foreign knowledge and expertise is predicted to result in a 23% increase in offshore integration while that same increase in industry foreign knowledge expertise results in a 14% standard deviation decrease in offshore outsourcing for higher foreign R&D intensive firms.
Additional Findings:
In addition to showing support for our main prediction, Table Four shows support for several of the additional predictions in Table 1 . First, as predicted in Table 1 , and in line with prior literature that has highlighted the role of global sourcing in allowing firms to access low-cost inputs, Table Four shows a positive and significant coefficient for industry production wages in the US on offshore outsourcing.
Thus, firms may be more likely to turn to global sourcing as they face increasing cost pressures at home.
Second, Table Four shows support for the prediction that global sourcing will increase with firm productivity, with firm size having a positive and significant impact on both offshore integration and offshore outsourcing, while firm ROA has a positive impact on offshore integration. This is in line with prior work (Antras and Helpman, 2004; Yeaple, 2006) that suggest that global sourcing increases with firm productivity. Third, consistent with Table 1 , we see positive and significant effects of both foreign to total assets and industry growth on offshore outsourcing.
It is interesting to note that many of the predictions from Table 1 seem to have a stronger effect on offshore outsourcing than on offshore integration. We believe this is consistent with our theoretical model, since it suggests that where firms are driven to source from abroad for reasons unrelated to foreign knowledge seeking they will tend to prefer offshore outsourcing to offshore integration. ***Insert Table 4 and Table 5 about here***
Robustness
To examine the robustness of our main results, we reran our models using alternate measures of our main firm foreign knowledge seeking variable. The results of these analyses are shown in Table Five. Models V, VI, and VII report the results for our offshore integration dependent variable and Models VIII, IX and X report the results for our offshore outsourcing dependent variable. Table Five show the results of using two alternate measures of foreign knowledge seeking on the offshore integration decisions of firms. Model V measures foreign knowledge seeking considering the skilled worker ratio of firms in their foreign subsidiaries. This measure comes from the BEA data and captures the proportion of higher skilled workers that are employed by firms in foreign countries (similar to the variable used by Yeaple, 2003b) . We use this measure to replace our firm foreign R&D intensity and interaction term in Model V. The results show that skilled workers have a positive and significant relationship with offshore integration, though the significance level for this measure is only at the .10 level. Model VI measures foreign R&D as a proportion of overall firm R&D, and show reveal a positive and significant interaction term across foreign R&D proportion and relevant foreign knowledge, confirming that our results hold across both of these alternate measures.Models VII and IX in Table Five show the results of these same alternate measures of foreign knowledge seeking considering the offshore outsourcing decisions of firms. These models show that skilled workers in foreign subsidiary operations have a significant negative relationship with offshore outsourcing and that the interaction between foreign R&D proportion and relevant foreign knowledge also continues to be significant and negative, providing robust support for the predictions from our model.
Models V and VI in
Finally, to further confirm the robustness of our results we use a system dynamic panel estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) . These dynamic panel models (implemented using xtdpdsys in STATA) use lags of the dependent variable as well as lagged differences in the independent variables as instruments to the regression, and are indicated for data with many panels and few periods, making them well-suited for our purpose. Results from re-running our analysis with the dynamic panel estimator are shown in Models XII and X of Table Five . Again, these interaction term results continue to confirm our main finding that as the availability of relevant foreign knowledge increases, and firms increasingly undertake R&D abroad, we see an increase in the extent of offshore integration and a reduction in the use of offshore outsourcing.
Discussion
In this study, we have examined the effect of foreign knowledge seeking on the global product sourcing decisions of firms. We argued that increasing investments in foreign R&D to tap into foreign knowledge and expertise will be accompanied by an increasing preference for production by owned foreign subsidiaries so as to best realize and capture the benefits of collocating R&D and production. We developed these arguments into a formal model that compares the relative profitability of alternate organizational arrangements in a context where firms endogenously determine the extent of R&D undertaken abroad, as a function of the availability of foreign knowledge and the benefits of collocating R&D and production. We tested the predictions of our model on a unique and comprehensive database of cross-border product transfers by US MNCs and showed that as firms increasingly invest in foreign R&D in the context of increasing availability of relevant foreign knowledge, they both increase their offshore integration and reduce their offshore outsourcing.
By studying the effects of knowledge seeking on the global product sourcing decisions of firms, we contribute to both the strategy and economics literatures. Our study contributes to the global strategy literature by examining the impact of foreign knowledge seeking on global product sourcing decisions.
While a substantial body of work in global strategy has highlighted the importance of knowledge seeking in driving FDI (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005; Nachum et al., 2008; Berry 2013) , location choice (Alcacer, 2006; Alcacer and Chung, 2007) , flow of knowledge from foreign subsidiaries (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Singh, 2005) and offshoring of services (Lewin et al., 2009) , the effect of knowledge seeking activities on global product sourcing has remained largely unexplored. Our study not only bridges this gap, it shows how knowledge seeking motives impact the organization of foreign production and drive a shift from offshore outsourcing to offshore integration. As such, our study links work on knowledge seeking to the organizational economics literature, not only examining internal and external sources of foreign production, but also studying the choice between the two. In particular, the findings of our study align with recent theoretical work that combines organizational economics and organizational capabilities perspectives (Argyres and Zenger, 2012; Kaul, 2013) , showing that the development of strategic capabilities abroad is accompanied by the internalization of foreign production and research activities.
In examining the benefits of integration, our study also highlights the benefits of collocating R&D and production, suggesting that firms going abroad may not only benefit from collocating their R&D activities with the R&D activities of others (Alcacer, 1996; Alcacer and Chung, 2007) and linking these activities to other parts of the firm internally (Singh, 2005; Alcacer and Zhao, 2012) , but also from the internal collocation of value chain activities (Alcacer and Delgado, 2012) . While our analysis does not provide a strict test of collocation benefits, our results are consistent with firms collocating R&D and production abroad to maximize the benefits from both, and our formal model sets the stage for further examination of these benefits.
At the same time, we contribute to the economics literature on global sourcing by highlighting the importance of knowledge seeking -a motive for foreign investment that is underexplored in the trade literature. While prior work on global sourcing has seen global product sourcing primarily as means of accessing low-cost inputs (Antras and Helpman, 2004; Antras and Rossi-Hansberg, 2009 ), our study
shows that firms also go abroad to tap into foreign knowledge and expertise, and that such knowledgeseeking investments have a significant influence on global sourcing decisions, since they increase the attractiveness of offshore integration. In particular, as our formal model implies and our empirical results
show, the intensity of headquarter activity may not be an exogenous characteristic of the industry, as assumed in prior work (Antras and Helpman, 2004) but may be endogenously determined by firms in light of the availability of foreign knowledge, with this firm-level decision driving the extent and organization of global sourcing.
In addition to studying the relation between knowledge seeking and global sourcing, our study also offers fresh insights on the drivers of global sourcing more generally. First, our model predicts that increasing cost pressures at home drive an increase in global sourcing, with our results showing that firms increasingly relying on offshore outsourcing as production wages in the home country increase. That these cost pressures have a stronger impact on offshore outsourcing than on offshore integration is consistent with our overall argument for offshore outsourcing being preferred when global sourcing is driven primarily by low-cost considerations. Further, we also find evidence for a positive effect of firm productivity and market growth on offshore integration, consistent with prior models of global sourcing (Antras and Helpman, 2004) . Overall, this study thus contributes to our understanding of the phenomenon of global sourcing, providing a detailed account of the factors that drive both offshore outsourcing and offshore integration.
Our paper also makes empirical contributions. Prior empirical work on global sourcing has generally relied on cross-sectional analyses, based either on international trade data at the industry level (Kotabe and Swan, 1994; Yeaple, 2006; Nunn, 2007; Nunn and Trefler, 2007; Bernard et al., 2009 ) or on survey data from a sample of multinationals (Kotabe and Omura, 1989; Kotabe and Murray, 1990; Murray et al., 1995; Lewin et al., 2008) . By conducting a firm-level longitudinal analysis using a comprehensive database of US multinationals with detailed, statutory data on cross-border product flows, our study offers a more rigorous test of the drivers of global sourcing than prior work. These product flow data are also combined with data on patents and on R&D spending at the subsidiary level, so as to better examine the effects of foreign knowledge seeking. The use of this unique database not only makes for a better test of our base prediction, it also allows us to test the predictions of prior economic models (Antras and Helpman, 2004; Antras and Rossi-Hansberg, 2009 ) in a more rigorous way.
This is not to suggest, of course, that our data are without limitations. One key limitation for our analysis is that we have limited information on product flows from third party suppliers, so that we can neither trace cross-border flows from third parties to subsidiaries of the firm, nor break these flows down by country of origin. As a result, we are neither able to include third party to subsidiary flows in our analysis of offshore outsourcing, nor study the choice of offshore integration vs. offshore outsourcing at a country by country level. These limitations notwithstanding, however, we believe our empirical analysis represents a substantial advance over prior work, and offers important insights into the drivers of global product sourcing, while providing a robust test of the predictions of our formal model.
To conclude, our study provides a fresh perspective on global sourcing, highlighting the role that foreign knowledge seeking activities play in the organization of product sourcing from abroad. We argue and show that increasing investments in foreign R&D in order to benefit from the growing availability of foreign knowledge are accompanied by both an increase in offshore integration and a reduction in offshore outsourcing. The growing importance of foreign knowledge seeking is thus seen to result in a growing reliance on production by foreign subsidiaries, and a reduced use of third party foreign suppliers. Where is the domestic production Profit; is the offshore outsourcing profit and is the offshore integration profit Table 2 b. Empirically, developing country PPE proportion is calculated at firm level to account for differences in firm locations. Developing country proportion has an inverse relation to foreign production cost. Prob> chi-sqr 0.00 0.00 Dependent variable is Offshore Integration in Models V, VI, and VII, and Offshore Outsourcing in Models VII, IX, and X. Models V, VI, VIII and IX were run using OLS (xtreg in STATA) and Models VII and IX were run using system dynamic panel models (xtdpdsys in STATA) and include lagged differences of variables as instruments. Sample includes 437 firms. All independent variables are lagged by one period. All models include robust standard errors. All models have Prob F>0 of less than .01%. Significance level (two-sided): † <10%, *<5%, **<1% 
